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CPLR 6214: Extension for perfection of attachment may be
granted even after ninety-day limitation period.
CPLR 6214 provides that a levy upon any interest in personal
property or debts made by service of an order of attachment is
void after ninety days unless: (1) the sheriff has taken into his
control the thing attached; or, (2) the plaintiff has commenced a
special proceeding to compel payment or delivery of the res; or,
(3) the plaintiff has procured an extension of the ninety-day
limitation.
Under the CPA, where an action was in rem and the levy
had not been perfected within the ninety-day period, the order of
attachment as well as the levy became void. Since the in rem
action was based upon the attachment, it had to be dismissed. 63
It has also been held under the CPA that a motion for an extension of time in which to perfect the levy of attachment had to
be made within the ninety-day period."" However, because of the
broad language used in CPLR 6214(e), some writers have felt
that an extension of time may be given even after the levy has
become void. 0 5
In Seider v. Roth,:' the appellate division, second department,
granted an extension of time in which to perfect a levy on the
defendant's interest in a liability insurance policy even though the
ninety-day period had expired. Because of "the novelty of the
question, the uncertain state of the law and the fact that the
requirement of "CPLR 6214 is largely ministerial as it relates to
intangible property ....,, 16 the court thought it appropriate to
grant an extension even though ninety days had already elapsed.
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CPLR 7501: No right to jury trial on threshold questions.
In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gottlieb, 6 the insurer
applied to stay arbitration of a claim against it, and sought an
immediate jury trial on the issue of whether or not the automobile
163

Sturcke v. Link, 176 Misc. 93, 26 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County

1941).
l64See

Nemeroff v. National City Bank, 262 App. Div. 145, 28 N.Y.S2d

295 (1st Dep't 1941).

165 7 WEmSTIN, KoRix & Mxuman,

Naw Yoax CiviL PRAcricE 116214.15

(1965).

16628 App. Div. 2d 698, 280 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (2d Dep't 1967).
For a full
analysis of the Seider case's complication, see 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 5201,

supp.
commentary 13-31 (1967).
167 Seider v. Roth, 28 App. Div. 2d 698, 699, 280 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1007
(2d Dep't 1967).
168 54 Misc. 2d 184, 281 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sup. Ct. Queens.,County 1967).

1968]

THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

operated by respondent was in physical contact with a hit and run
automobile. The supreme court, Queens County, held that the insurer
was not entitled to the jury trial requested, but, rather, to a
preliminary hearing by the court on the issue.0 9
While there is no constitutional right to a jury trial of issues
raised on a motion to stay arbitration, 7 0 Sections 1450 and 1458(2)
of the Civil Practice Act granted a statutory right to such a trial.
Although these sections were not transposed to the CPLR, the
general feeling of authors 171 and commentators,1 7 2 based on the
Second Report of the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure, was that the new arbitration provisions were not intended
to eliminate trial by jury if desirable or constitutionally required.
This seemingly clear evidence of legislative intent regarding the
right to jury trial weakens, somewhat, the arguments posed by the
court in favor of their holding, i.e., that the legislature has had
ample time to correct any alleged error and that calendar delay
demanded the decision.
NEw YORK INSURANcE LAW
Ins. Law § 167: Defense of failure to cooperate difficult to establish.
Section 167 of the Insurance Law provides that, upon the
service of notice, a judgment creditor of an insured may maintain
a direct suit against a judgment debtor's insurance company in
order to satisfy a judgment. The insured's failure to cooperate
with the insurer is a defense of the insurer to this direct action.
However, the73 burden of proving such lack of cooperation is upon
the insurer.
In Thrasher v. United States Liability Insurance Co.,'17 plaintiffs, judgment creditors of an insured, sought to satisfy their
judgments against the judgment debtor's insurer. The defendant
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